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Abstract: Recent heterodox economic literature makes reference to Hilferding’s “Finance 
Capital” and Lenin’s “Imperialism” as early insights on the phenomenon of Financialization 
of capital. In this regard ideas which became dominant in the left during the first decades of 
the previous century are applied in the explanation of the current crisis, as well as the 
understanding of contemporary capitalism from a methodological, analytical and political 
standpoint. This paper traces the underlying argument of the Monopoly model and its main 
political applications in the first three decades of the 20
th
 century, in an effort to draw rough 
historical analogies with its revival in contemporary literature. It is argued that the 
Hilferding model, from which Lenin’s ”Imperialism” is derived, has very little or nothing to 
do with Marx’s economics but much to do with the neoclassical theory of Monopoly and 
Oligopoly. This theoretical association abolishes labor value theory from the analytical 
framework and with it any possibility of inherent breakdown (depression) in capitalist 
accumulation. Consequently political economy was pushed to the background and the 
confrontations between Lenin and Kautsky and subsequently Trotsky, Bukharin and Stalin 
were fought around political and geopolitical considerations a factor which played important 
part in the outcome. But the most astonishing historical fact is that the revolutionary flood 
which shook Europe until 1930 gave place to the dominance of the extreme right when 
circumstances were most favorable for the left in the years of the “great depression”. 
Drawing from this it is argued further that the main analogy between the 1930s’ and the 
present is that both back then and now the left is attempting to intervene in a depression 
environment without a depression theory. Disproportional growth between sectors was the 
cause of crisis in Hilferding, a contradiction which under the dominance of “Finance 
Capital” would be resolved and capitalism would move to an “organized stage”.  In the same 
fashion disproportional growth of the financial sector relative to the corporate sector, which 
emerged following the “great stagflation”, is the cause of the present crisis for contemporary 
heterodox literature. Crisis can be resolved through state regulation in this line of thought, 
since Financialization of capital is understood independently from the inherent contradictions 
of profit motivated growth. In the absence of a depression theory this part of heterodox 
economics has drifted in a “witch hunt” on whether capital will resolve the crisis introducing 
a new era of “regulated capitalism” or power shifts in favor of financial capital will preserve 
the present state of affairs. In the meantime, economic policy suggestions and the political 
agenda is surrendered in the hands of mainstream economics and right wing politics.  
 
Introduction: 
 
The outburst of the current crisis has triggered fresh interest in Marxist and heterodox 
economics. However a good deal of recent heterodox economic literature (Lapavitsas 2009
1
) 
has been focused in identifying a new set of economic relations allegedly unique to the 
current episode in the history of capitalism, while others consider the present crisis a result of 
the stagnant nature of Monopoly capitalism (Sweezy P. 1997
2
). This treatment of capitalist 
dynamics bears no novelty both in terms of methodology and analytical conclusions. Actually 
the proponents of this set of theories point to the works of Hilferding (Hilferding R. 1910
3
) 
and Lenin (Lenin V. 1916
4
) as examples of their methodological approach and in part of their 
analytical conclusions. This paper attempts to trace the intellectual origins of the view of 
capitalism as sequence of stages in historical context. 
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The purpose of this venture, through the exploration of the argument underlying the 
Hilferding model, is to identify historical analogies between the 1930’s and the present using 
political economy models in each period as frame of reference.  My interest was triggered 
from the fact that the left has performed its worst at depression times, that is at times when 
one would expect it to dominate and besides actual difficulties the absence of a depression 
theory certainly played a part. 
The paper is structured as follows: The first section (I) explores the “breakdown debate”, 
which was the central theme in the left during the first decade of the previous century, in 
order to explore the reasons for the dominance of the Hilferding model. In the second section 
(II) the argument underlying “Finance Capital” and its association with mainstream 
economics are explored.  The third and fourth (III, IV) section is devoted to the incorporation 
of the Monopoly model by the Bolshevik party and the Comintern respectively. In the fifth 
section (V) the political economy standing behind the clashing political lines inside the 
Bolshevik party in the 1920’s are presented. The next section (VI) discusses the modern 
revival of the “stage” argument and the final section summarizes.  
 
I. Historical and Intellectual Background.  (The “Breakdown  Debate”) 
 
It was at the eve of the previous century when the left of the time, represented in great 
part by the 2
nd
 international, engaged in a debate on whether a “breakdown” is inherent in the 
dynamics of capitalist accumulation. The recovery of world capitalism from 1870-1890 
depression drove prominent members of the international to proclaim the need to “revise” the 
Marxist heritage of the old social democracy. Economic works of the time, coming mainly 
from “legal Marxists”, argued that capitalism is an ever growing system, growth interrupted 
by recessions like the five and ten year cycles observed in capitalist economies, the latter 
attributed to disproportional-ties of various forms. Concluding that socialism does not emerge 
from economic necessity the “revisionists” preached in favor of gradual reforms ensuring that 
the working class will improve its position in the process of capitalist growth. This was the 
political line of the “right” wing of the old international where Edward Bernstein was the 
most prominent figure (Bernstein 1899
5
). 
The most esteemed Marxist theorist of the time Karl Kautsky, who has the father of 
the term “revisionists”, did not particularly contest the notion of unimpeded growth under 
capitalism, although in various parts of his writings one can find under-consumption 
arguments. What he practically did was to reduce the notion of “breakdown” to a situation of 
an irreversible downturn in capitalist accumulation and argue that no such conviction was 
held by Marx. On these grounds he teamed with O. Bauer who took the argument further 
suggesting that the law of the falling rate of profit cannot function as the basis of a 
“breakdown theory”. In this regard Bauer presented a simulation of Marx’s schemes of 
expanded reproduction (Bauer 1913
6
) showing that although the rate of profit kept declining 
by construction, profits (mass of profit) increased. The simulation was misleading, Bower 
stopped calculating after the fourth period but when the simulation is extended to multiple 
periods the mass of profit declines indicating a breakdown in accumulation, however this was 
shown almost twenty years later by Henryk Grossman (Grossman 1929
7
). For the time 
Kautsky and Bauer, agreeing that socialism is a matter of “social consciousness” and not 
economic necessity, formed the “center” faction of the 2nd International. The political line of 
the “center” accepted the preaching of the right that the labor class should make the most of 
accumulation under capitalism but kept also the socialist potential as a matter for the future. 
What identified the left of the international was the conviction that the interests of the 
troubled masses cannot be satisfied in the capitalist mode of production and this will 
inevitably lead to an insurrection led by the working class. In this context the primary duty of 
social democracy was to agitate and prepare this liberating event. Both prominent figures of 
the “left”, V. Lenin and R. Luxemburg, shared this revolutionary commitment however they 
took different approaches on the “breakdown” issue.  
Luxemburg acknowledged that if capitalism was a system of unimpeded growth then 
socialism “loses its granite foundation of objective historical necessity” deducted to the “mere 
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injustice and badness of the present-day world and from the mere revolutionary determination 
of the working class”. But her effort, to base revolutionary commitment on economic 
grounds, fell short of its objective. In the book “Accumulation of Capital” (Luxemburg R. 
1913 
8
) Luxemburg put forward an under-consumption argument, suggesting that growth in 
capitalism was contingent on demand coming from non-capitalist regions. She proclaimed 
that an increasing gap between workers consumption, capitalist consumption and replacement 
of machinery on one hand and total product value on the other prevails in capitalist 
reproduction. It made no sense, to her, for capitalists to close this gap through savings and 
investment since the capitalist class will be realizing this way part of its own surplus value. 
Missing the mere fact that this is exactly what capitalist production is all about, to invest 
profits, borrowed funds or both in an effort to make more profits, she concluded that when 
capitalism will dominate globally this will coincide with its inevitable end since value will 
remain unrealized.  
Lenin recognized in Luxemburg’s work the under-consumption argument of the 
Narodniks he had attacked in his 1899 pamphlet “The Development of Capitalism in Russia” 
(Lenin V. 1899
9
).  In his view crises emerge because of disproportional growth of department 
I (production of means of production) relative to department II (production of means of 
consumption) a fluctuation similar to the ten year cycle observed in capitalist economies. 
Therefore contrary to Luxemburg the historical necessity of socialism does not emerge from 
the inherent contradictions of growth under capitalism. It is capitalist development itself, 
leading to the greatest socialization of production and the narrowest personal appropriation of 
its results, which brings the necessity for socialist transformation (Lenin 1913
10
). A position 
similar to that of the “center” with the difference that Lenin held the conviction that the 
capitalist state cannot be transformed to a socialist one (Lenin 1917
11
) and that the impulsive 
insurrection of the masses can be turned to a conscious struggle for socialism only through the 
mediation of the vanguard of the proletariat, in other words the communist party, the latter his 
most important political invention in the words of the Marxist historian Eric Hobsbawm. 
In conclusion the first decade of the 20
th
 century found the left of the day in absolute 
confusion on the argument underlying Max’s Capital. Especially for the center and the left 
faction, at a time when strong growth, which followed the last depression, was beginning to 
fade and the drums of the forthcoming war were clearly heard, a persuasive argument 
supporting the preaching for socialism was missing. This was the reason which led both the 
center and the left to clink so heavily on the book by Rudolf Hilferding “Finance Capital” 
which came out in Vienna in 1910. The books’ main argument claimed to originate from 
Marx’s theory of concentration and centralization of capital, Marx’s most undisputed 
prediction in the words of Wassily Leontief. It also signaled strong political messages 
suggesting that capitalism was headed to an “organized stage” which was the best preparation 
for socialism as understood by the center, at the same time possible conflicts arising from the 
“urgent need” for capital export in the era of monopoly suited the call for revolt preached by 
the left. However, between the origin of the argument and the strong political messages 
derived from it stands a basically neoclassical model as elaborated in the next section. 
The argument underlying “Finance Capital” was overshadowed by the political 
messages derived from it and the book was greeted with enthusiasm by the “center” and the 
“left” faction of the old international. Kautsky named the book the “fourth volume of capital”, 
Bukharin and Lenin wrote derivative works based on it and it was only Bernstein who 
criticized its content. The critique however was limited to the part relating to the appearance 
of tariffs at the “latest stage of capitalist development” which in Bernstein’s view was not 
consistent with the ever growing capitalism he visualized. 
At the eve of a war which was about to change everything including the international 
itself the dominance of the monopoly model marked the partition of Marxist political 
economy from the political movement of the left, a gap which lasts to this day with few 
exceptions. 
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II. Monopoly Capitalism – The Hilferding Model  
 
“The latter [Monopoly prices-NS] would themselves be determined, however, by the 
reciprocal relationship between costs of production and volume of output on the one hand, 
and prices and the volume of sales on the other. The monopoly price would be that price 
which makes possible a volume of sales such that the scale of production does not increase 
the costs of production so greatly as to reduce the profit per unit significantly. A higher price 
would reduce sales, and hence the scale of production, thus raising costs and reducing the 
profit per unit of output; a lower price would reduce profit so greatly that even the greater 
volume of sales would not compensate for it” (Hilfering 1910
3
)  
 
Well we have all seen this price determination format somewhere and we can find out 
where if we present it graphically. We have a negatively sloped demand curve (D curve 
below), a linear negatively sloped unit cost curve, ensuring that marginal cost declines with 
the scale of production which implies that total cost will decline as well (MC curve bellow) 
and we need a marginal revenue curve in order to determine profit maximization (MR curve 
below). The following graph pictures the curves: 
   
 
 
This graph is copied from a micro neoclassical text book (Henderson & Quant 1987
12
) similar 
constructions can be found in any neoclassical micro textbook. Point (Po, Qo) on the demand 
curve (D) has the properties indicated by Hilferding irrespective of whether the monopolist is 
a price or a quantity setter. Like Hilferding the neoclassical economist states: “The 
monopolist can increase her profit by increasing (or contracting) her output as long as the 
addition to her marginal revenue exceeds (or is less than) the addition to her cost (MC)” 
(H&Q p. 179).  
In order to disperse any doubts on whether the above association might be a 
misconception of his writings Hilferding states: 
 
“Monopoly price can indeed be fixed empirically, but its proper level cannot be apprehended 
in an objective theoretical manner, only grasped psychologically and subjectively. ... If 
monopolistic combinations abolish competition, they eliminate at the same time the only 
means through which an objective law of price can actually prevail. ... It seems that the 
monopolistic combine, while it confirms Marx's theory of concentration, at the same time 
tends to undermine his theory of value. [Emphasis added – NS]” (Hilferding 1910
3
) 
 
The extract does not leave any room for misconception, the process of accumulation 
and the consequent concentration of capital abolishes competition and with it labor value. 
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Thus, surplus value, the tendency of the rate of profit to fall and finally the inherent 
possibility of a depression i.e. of a breakdown in accumulation are also abolished. All of the 
above rest on Hilferding’s view on the dominant position of the neoclassical Monopolist in 
the market.  
 
This is a quite amazing result; capitalism can solve its basic inherent contradictions 
by a simple agreement, between capitalists to curtail production provided that their collective 
control over output is sufficient and sustainable. However, this miracle rests on a 
misconception from Hilferding not just of “Monopoly capitalism”, if such economy ever 
exists, but of capitalism in general. Although he considers that mechanization increases in the 
process of capitalist development, this process is contingent upon competition. He states: 
 
“The achievement of the largest possible profit is the motive of every individual capitalist, 
and becomes the guiding principle of his economic action as a necessary consequence 
[emphasis added-NS] of the capitalist competitive struggle.” (Hilferding 1910
3
) 
 
And to clear any possible doubt he adds: 
 
«... the tendencies which give rise to a protracted decline in the rate of profit and in its 
average level, ... can only be overcome by eliminating their cause – competition [emphasis 
added-NS].»  
 
This is definitely not the case in Marx. In capital VI (Marx 1896
13
) Marx argues that 
automation becomes the dominant form of increasing the social productivity of labor and this 
is done not to get additional profit from other capitalists but to increase the extraction of 
relative surplus value from workers, the source of profit in capitalism. Mechanization, thus 
results from the labor process itself. This inherent tendency, as we know, leads to an 
increasing organic composition of capital and a declining rate of profit as presented in Capital 
VIII. Competition does not produce this law of capitalist accumulation (declining rate of 
profit) it makes it evident. Because capitalist competition emerges out of the fundamental 
conflicting production relations in capitalism, it is not a game it is a «war» fought with the 
«cheapening of commodities», it decides who lives or dies. For the capitalist it imposes an 
investment criterion on the inherent process of mechanization, mechanization must reduce the 
unit cost of commodities and increase the profit margin at the highest possible rate of profit. 
But this does not necessarily imply an increased corporate rate of profit following the 
transient period when old prices prevail, on the contrary it implies a lower profit rate in most 
of the cases since «the increase in the productive powers of labor must be paid for» as Marx 
states. In other words more productive techniques involve lower unit production costs but 
higher unit investment costs (the capital output ratio increases). Therefore when a more 
productive technique is implemented the company holding the competitive advantage will cut 
prices and try to pierce the market share of competitors to make good of its investment, the 
competitors will be forced to adopt the new technique to protect their profits and 
consequently the industry rate of profit will decline. Corporations for Marx are not passive 
«price takers» like the neoclassical firm. 
Where does Hilferding stand in all this?  Because, he suggests that mechanization 
depends on capitalist competition that is on the free will of capitalist enterprise (neoclassical 
present value and IRR models are examples of this investment theory) any new technique 
does not reduce the rate of profit but conversely increases it, if it does not then the new 
technique will not be applied in the first place. The following amazing passage is indicative: 
 
«..., if someone produces more cheaply and can sell more goods, thus assuming more room on 
the market by selling below the current market price, or market value, he does it, and thereby 
he begins an action which gradually compels the others to introduce the cheaper mode of 
production and reduces the socially necessary labor to a new and lower level. If one side 
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[sides are buyers or sellers over the course of the cycle, here Hilferding refers to sellers–NS] 
has the advantage, everyone belonging to it gains. It is as though they had exerted their 
common monopoly.»  
 
Under Marx we would anticipate that the «new technique» would result in a lower 
industry rate of profit once it is generally «introduced» and new lower market prices reign1. In 
Hilferding as long as excess supply does not prevail everyone profits from it. Therefore, at the 
new lower market prices the new technique remains more profitable. This implies that any 
viable new technique, in Hilferding, has a higher than the average rate of profit. For this last 
result to hold a specific theory of competition must hold as well and this is no other than the 
neoclassical theory of perfect competition. In perfect competition the firm is a passive profit 
maximizer it maximizes profit given the technology (cost curve) and the market price, thus it 
will apply a new technique only if it has a higher than the uniform rate of profit. Hilferding’s’ 
«monopoly combination» is so effective because its «constituent parts» are passive 
neoclassical price takers.  
Years following the publication of «Finance Capital» the «Cambridge School» 
proved that if capitalist firms apply only higher than average rate of profit techniques the rate 
of profit will not decline, contrary it will increase at the absence of wage increases. But this is 
not the case in Hilferding, He expressly states that the rising organic composition of capital 
reduces the rate of profit in «competitive capitalism». Is this a contradiction? I argue it is not 
and we will see why if we take a closer look in his crisis theory. Prior to presenting the 
argument, however, it must be stressed that by crisis, Hilferding implies the ten year cycle 
observed in capitalist economies reflecting adjustments of capital stock to capacity utilization. 
In this regard He states:     
 
«The higher organic composition of capital, however, is only the economic expression of 
increased productivity, which means a lower price for the same quantity of commodities. 
Newly invested capital, therefore, obtains an extra profit, and capital will flow into such 
spheres of investment. At this point a disruptive factor supervenes. The larger the extra profit 
to be made from these new investments the more capital flows into these spheres. This 
movement can only be corrected when the new products of these sectors of industry come on 
to the market, and oversupply depresses prices» (Hilferding 1910 Ch. 17) 
 
The first half of the extract repeats what has already been said regarding the «choice 
of technique» issue. Higher profit rate, higher organic composition investments are the only 
viable. Therefore, the organic composition of capital does not increase because of a higher 
unit capital output ratio in normal capacity utilization as in Marx, but because of a «disruptive 
factor». The «disruptive factor» is the tendency of overinvestment in the high organic 
composition sector(s) (sector I) which arises mainly from profit rate differentials together 
with a lag in capacity growth resulting from the longer time required to construct capital 
intensive plants. Therefore, investment allocation is «disproportionately» greater in sector I. 
In Hilferding, due to the «perfect competition» assumption, technology (not capitalist 
production relations) is the cause of rising organic composition. Therefore this tendency is not 
uniform it depends on the production process in each industry this giving rise to persistent and 
increasing profit differentials. As investment expenditure in sector I gradually turns to 
capacity the «disproportionality becomes apparent». This is because production in sector II 
(low profit, low organic composition sector) has already increased due to faster capacity 
adjustments. As a result general oversupply prevails driving down prices and the average 
                                                 
1«Yet every such new method of production cheapens the commodities ... [the capitalist-NS] pockets 
the difference between their costs of production and the market prices of the same commodities 
produced at higher costs of production ... His method of production stands above the social average. 
But competition makes it general and subject to the general law. There follows a fall in the rate of 
profit-perhaps first in this sphere, and eventually it achieves a balance with the rest-which is, therefore, 
wholly independent of the will of the capitalist» (Marx, 1967, vol. III, ch. 15, pp. 264--265).  
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profit rate. The rise in the organic composition of capital and the declining rate of profit result 
from overinvestment in sector I
2
. This is why Hilferding states: «If production is carried on in 
the proper proportions ... these relations [relative prices-NS] need not change and no 
disruption [oversupply-NS] need occur.» (Hilferding 1910 ch. 17). 
The Hilferding crisis theory of «competitive capitalism» is a poor early version of a 
series of theories where the organic composition of capital increases from some disruptive 
factor rather than the inherent tendency of mechanization in capitalist production. All these 
models share a common element the «perfect competition» assumption which prohibits the 
adoption of lower profit rate techniques. In this line the Dobb model (Dobb...) is a relevant 
example and far more consistent argument compared to the one in Hilferding. 
Having reduced capitalist competition to perfect competition Hilferding moves to a 
series of assumptions which support the notion that cartelization is the dominant trend of 
capitalist development. All these arguments, however, rely on the passive profit maximizing 
view of the capitalist firm discussed above. The extract which follows is indicative.                  
Since, these lower production cost lower investment cost techniques are rare and 
become increasingly rare in the process of capitalist development the following market 
structure prevails before cartelization: 
   
 «.... highly developed industries are precisely the ones in which.... Not only does the large 
firm predominate, but these large, capital-intensive concerns tend to become more equally 
matched, as the technical and economic differences which would give some of them a 
competitive advantage are steadily reduced [ emphasis added – NS]. The competitive struggle 
is ... a struggle between equals, which can remain indecisive for a long time, imposing equal 
sacrifices on all the contending parties.» (Hilferding 1910)          
 
We have companies with no competitive advantage against other companies few or 
no options to materialize such an advantage and even fewer reasons to exercise these options. 
At the same time firms are unable to influence price individually by altering production. What 
is left for them is either to maximize profit given the market price, or to collectively curtail 
output. This latter option becomes sustainable at the presence of mounting difficulties in the 
mobility of capital. But the decisive factor which makes cartelization the most profitable 
option is that capitalist firms taken individually have been reduced to neoclassical profit 
maximizes.  
Hilferding, then attempts to prove why cartelization in one branch gives rise to a 
general trend towards cartelization but also vertical integration between industries where 
adequate concentration of capital has occurred. He concludes as follows: 
 
«The limitation of the free movement of capital by various economic factors or property 
relations (such as a monopoly of raw materials) is indeed a precondition for the abolition of 
market competition among sellers. Equalization of the rate of profit can only take place by 
participation in the higher rate of profit through self - cartelization, or through the elimination 
of cartels by vertical integration. Both methods involve a growth of concentration and thus 
facilitate further cartelization.» (Hilferding 1910) 
 
The obvious question is how profit rates are equalized between cartelized sectors 
under limited capital mobility. Well a huge surprise is waiting us since Hilferding few lines 
below and with reference to the rate of profit of the non - cartelized sector makes the 
following amazing statement: 
 
« The same price would then produce a lower rate of profit than before, because the price of 
raw materials (that is, the cost price) had risen. If, previously, the price of the product was 100 
                                                 
2
 «...decline in the rate of profit is entailed by the change in the organic composition of capital, which 
has taken place as a result of the investment of new capital» (Hilferding ch. 17) 
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and the rate of profit 20 per cent, the latter would now fall to 10 per cent because the cost 
price which was 80 will have risen to 90 as a result of cartelization» 
 
A closer look on the numerical example leaves little room of misunderstanding 
Hilferding has reduced the rate of profit to a measure given by the formula: 
  
 
 
 
The only place where such a formula can be considered a measure of the rate of profit 
is in neoclassical theory where the rate of profit is equal to the marginal product of capital 
(MPOC). In this case the following relations hold in perfect competition (pc) and monopoly 
(m) respectively: 
 
 
 
 
 In perfect competition (pc) long run equilibrium price is equal to average total cost 
(actual and opportunity) and profit minus actual cost equals to opportunity cost (OC) which is 
the neoclassical unit profit. The ratio of the two (Eq. 2) is the uniform neoclassical normal 
rate of profit which of course has nothing to do with the rate of profit in classical economics 
and Marx. Hilferding’s definition can be associated only to the neoclassical notion. In 
monopoly the neoclassical measure is altered because marginal revenue (MR) is different 
from price (p) and a positive economic profit (EP) is recognized. Eq. (3) can be modified, 
however, to identify the implications of the equalization argument suggested by Hilferding. 
Assuming that for r = OC/MR, r = r* i.e. to the normal rate of profit then Eq. 3 can be written 
as follows: 
 
 
 
 From monopoly price formation we know that the unit «economic profit» earned by 
the monopolist and marginal revenue (MR) are provided by the following formulas: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
And if profit rates are to be equalized between monopolists 1, 2 then the following relation 
must hold: 
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 Eq. (7) implies that when relative prices reflect relative marginal costs then profit 
rates are equalized like in perfect competition, but between monopoly industries this 
equalization requires further that monopoly power (reflected in finite demand elasticity) is 
balanced between sectors. The above are equivalent to an equal markup charged by the 
monopolist on marginal cost. Similar results were reached in the context of the Cambridge 
debate on «imperfect competition» of the late 1920’s early 1930’s and were ruled out as 
unrealistic. This heroic assumption, however, is needed by Hilferding to rule out the 
possibility of competition and capital mobility inside the cartelized sector. The main 
equalizing factor rests on the slope of the negative demand curves faced by «monopoly 
combinations» as opposed to the infinite elasticity demand curve of the perfectly competitive 
firm. 
But for «monopoly combination» equilibrium to hold the cartelized industry must 
purchase inputs from a perfectly competitive market if it faces a positive input supply curve 
then optimization as shown in the previous chart is impossible. Hilferding thus needs another 
heroic assumption. When the sector purchasing inputs from the «monopoly combination» is 
ripe for cartelization then it will not form a monopsony through self – cartelization but in 
order to keep the argument valid it will become vertically integrated with the cartelized 
industry and the «monopoly combination» will take place at a higher level of capital 
concentration. Like the heroic assumptions of the neoclassical economist to establish the 
perfect operation of the free market, Hilferding applies heroic assumptions to establish the 
trend towards cartelization.  
As noted above, the tendency towards higher organic composition is not uniform 
since it emerges from the conditions of competition between perfectly competitive firms. 
Therefore, inside the national economy competitive sectors will remain in existence. These 
sectors are assumed to belong to the final goods industry (food, beverages etc.) and this is 
because their products are considered perfect substitutes as we will show shortly. Hilferding 
argues that the rate of profit in these industries will be lower than the cartelized sector and 
will tend towards the neoclassical risk free rate of profit which is equal to the rate of interest. 
Assuming further that the average competitive rate of profit prior to cartelization exceeds the 
rate of interest, Hilferding, suggests that the difference of the two is the (maximum) rate by 
which the cartelized sector exploits non-cartelized industries. However, the whole argument 
rests on the following assumption: 
 
«If non-cartelized industry were to form a combination of its own the price of non-cartelized 
products would not change» (Hilferding 1910) 
 
This is another amazing statement, the competitive industry can -not «pass through» 
any part of a uniform increase in costs, coming from monopoly inputs, to the final price. This 
assumption implies that non-cartelized industries face infinite elasticity demand curves like 
the firms they include or in other words their products are perfect substitutes. From the social 
relations of capitalist production in Marx the economic model which dominated one century 
of left thinking based the dynamics of capitalist economies on the elasticity of Marshallian 
demand curves. Paraphrasing a note by the Marxist thinker Paul Mattick titled «Kautsky from 
Marx to Hitler» (Mattick 194014) we can state «Hilferding from Marx to Marshall».  
The argument underlying «Finance Capital» must be by now clear, it is a mix of the 
neoclassical theory of perfect competition where higher organic composition techniques are 
considered more profitable together with the reduction of the rate of profit to the neoclassical 
notion of the marginal product of capital. Specific assumptions on different types of 
Marshallian industry demand curves determine the market structure and trends. In the 
remainder of the section I will present the main conclusions of the model which 
overshadowed the underlying argument.        
At first the idea that monopoly combinations exploit the whole society workers, 
peasants, small capitalists, even consumers in general, broadened the potential audience of the 
old social democratic parties. Especially in backward countries where labor class was a 
minority new social alliances could be justified. The political objectives of these alliances, 
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however, could vary basis the political objectives of the faction dominating each party. For 
the Bolsheviks, for instance, the argument could be read as an existing potential social 
majority which could support a socialist revolution comprising of industrial workers, land 
workers, small and middle peasants.  
Furthermore, because cartels will not expand production rapidly because they need 
restricted supply in order to exist, as investment opportunities decline in the sense discussed 
above, national capital growth is retarded and huge amounts of financial capital accumulate. 
Hilferding, thus argues than in the cartelized (advanced) economies the export of capital 
becomes an «urgent matter». This means that room for potential conflict exists in the 
competition of financial capitals to grasp new markets and new investment territory. The state 
as an expression of the national ruling class protects local cartels through tariffs and supports 
them in their international expansion with diplomacy and canons. These two conclusions were 
grasped by the Bolsheviks to form their political line against both their inter-party rivals the 
Mensheviks (until 1912 and their partition in the Prague conference) and following the 
declaration of WWI against the center and the right of the old Social Democracy. In the next 
section, we will discuss their reasoning in extend, through the derivative works of Lenin and 
Bukharin on the subject. 
But there was also a second reading of the dynamics of «Monopoly Capitalism». 
Hilferding, argues that from an economic standpoint «there are no limits to cartelization». 
Basis the arguments presented above the non- cartelized sectors of national economies will be 
eventually «annexed by them [the cartels-NS]». Under this reasoning the formation of a 
«general cartel» is the dominant tendency. Thus any economic contradictions are eliminated 
and only property relations stand between labor class (and its allies) and the bright future of 
socialism. Around these assertions the «center» of the international could form its own 
political line. This was done by Kautsky in the most articulate manner. At first he stated that 
social democracy should act to prevent arms race and War (Kautsky 1911
15
) and agitate in 
favor of multinational integration in what he called «United States of Europe». If war 
emerged because of the action of a single capitalist state it would end in a socialist revolution. 
Following the outburst of WWI He modified his position and argued that following the war 
the prevalence of «Ultra Monopoly», another name for the «United States of Europe», was 
economically possible (Kautsky K. 1914
16
). The debate on the breakdown of capitalism was 
thus degraded in a dispute around the inevitability of war on one hand and the emergence of 
Ultra Monopoly on the other. Political and geopolitical matters came to the top of the agenda 
since from the monopoly model both outcomes were possible.  
             In the real world cartels, trusts etc. have proved to be transient phenomena in the 
history of capitalism, a truce in the ongoing «war» of capitalist competition which persists 
irrespective of the size of the competing capitalist corporations. Even the oldest and strongest 
cartel of modern times the OPEC has been unable to control oil prices both on the upside as 
well as the downside although it controls a huge part of the world oil supply. The fluctuations 
in oil price can be explained much better by the productivity of oil wells (Marx’s theory of 
rent) rather than the decisions of the cartel on oil production. Recent econometric studies have 
shown that profit rates between industry «regulating capitals» tend to become equalized on 
average over the course of the business cycle therefore monopoly power (expressed in 
persistent profit rate differentials) is not a permanent phenomenon of modern capitalism.  
Leaving the money and finance theory of Hilferding to be considered together with 
modern revival attempts of «Finance Capital» we move to discuss the major works through 
which the «Monopoly Model» was incorporated in the «third international». 
 
III Lenin – Bukharin and Monopoly Capitalism: 
 
The SPD vote in favor of war credits was the epilogue of the 2nd International. Social 
Democrat revolutionaries realized they had nothing to expect from the center and the right 
wing of the old international so their roads parted. As result the base of the revolutionary 
faction moved to the only party in which it held the majority the Russian Social Democratic 
Labor Party. The Bolsheviks kept from the old international only the Hilferding model and 
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especially the convenient conclusions mentioned above. These conclusions were incorporated 
in their political agenda through the book by N. Bukharin «Imperialism and World Economy» 
(Bukharin 1915
17) and the pamphlet by Lenin «Imperialism the Highest state of Capitalism-A 
Popular Outline» (Lenin 1916
4
). The ideas analyzed therein were included in the Bolshevik 
émigré party conference resolutions (Switzerland FEBR-MAR 1915). Although the work of 
Bukharin came out earlier we will begin our reference with Lenin because His views were the 
official party views.  
            The concluding lines of Lenin’s introduction of «Imperialism and World Economy» 
give the outline of the new phase of the conflict inside the left at the time: 
 
«Can one, however, deny that in the abstract a new phase of capitalism to follow imperialism, 
namely, a phase of ultra-imperialism [Lenin refers to Kautsky’s «Ultra Monopoly»-NS], is 
"thinkable"? No. In the abstract one can think of such a phase. In practice, however.... the 
development in this direction is proceeding under such stress, with such a tempo, with such 
contradictions, conflicts, and convulsions-not only economical, but also political, national, 
etc., etc.-that before a single world trust will be reached, before the respective national 
finance capitals will have formed a world union of "ultra-imperialism," imperialism will 
inevitably explode, capitalism will turn into its opposite» (Lenin - Bukharin 1915
17
)   
 
Lenin does not take any distance from both readings of Hilferding mentioned above, 
not even from the extension of these conclusions outside national boundaries by Kautsky. The 
latter, suggesting that capitalism can evolve beyond the stage of Imperialism. His protest is 
against the economic and mainly on the political feasibility of the Ultra-Monopoly outcome. 
Actually, Lenin never concealed that his pamphlet was derivative work to Finance Capital. 
Indicative are the following words included in the abstract:  
 
«In 1910, there appeared in Vienna the work of the Austrian Marxist, Rudolf Hilferding, 
Finance Capital (Russian edition, Moscow, 1912). In spite of the mistake the author makes 
on the theory of money, and in spite of a certain inclination on his part to reconcile Marxism 
with opportunism, this work gives a very valuable theoretical analysis of “the latest phase of 
capitalist development”, as the subtitle runs»  
 
This is a highly commendable reference for a rival inside the old international and 
specifically addressed to the part of Hilferding’s argument which reduces capitalist 
competition to perfect competition. Actually the first chapter of Lenin’s «Imperialism» is 
devoted to a popularized presentation of this argument where the notion of «perfect 
competition» is presented even more explicitly than in «Finance Capital».  
 
«Competition becomes transformed into monopoly....This is something quite different from 
the old free competition between manufacturers, scattered and out of touch with one another, 
and producing for an unknown market» 
 
The passive price taker neoclassical firm appears in the above extract taking decisions 
about output in isolation from its competitors knowing only the market price and its cost 
function. This is capitalist competition in Lenin’s view. Therefore, what has been presented in 
the previous section is taken for granted as the starting point of the analysis.  
Following a reference to the dominance of banks and finance capital in the era of 
monopoly, Lenin moves to analyze the conclusions of Hilferding and mainly the one referring 
to the «urgent need» for capital export from cartelized (advanced) capitalist nations to 
backward capitalist countries
3
. There he states: 
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«In these backward countries profits are usually high, for capital is scarce, the price of land is 
relatively low, wages are low, raw materials are cheap. ... The need to export capital arises 
from the fact that in a few countries capitalism has become “overripe” and (owing to the 
backward state of agriculture and the poverty of the masses) capital cannot find a field for 
“profitable” investment»(Lenin...) 
 
Amazing, profit is not surplus value in monetary form but the price of capital which 
like any other commodity in neoclassical value theory is determined by scarcity. The need to 
export capital by the advanced countries is a repetition of the Hilferding argument, Lenin’s 
reasoning, however, holds some degree of novelty. The argument develops as follows: 
investment in agriculture could improve the production of necessities and absorb excess 
capital. But this would increase wages, a decline in the reserve army of labor or a rise in 
ground rent or both are implied here, therefore disproportional growth of industry in relation 
to agriculture in advanced economies prevails at the stage of imperialism. This suggests 
further that international trade takes place in unequal terms, advanced nations purchasing 
agricultural products and natural resources in competitive prices while selling their own 
products in monopoly prices. Therefore the gap between advanced and backward countries is 
not expected to close in the process of capitalist development. On the other hand advanced 
countries with a disproportionately developed industrial sector desperately need new markets 
and investment territory to cover excess capacity and exploit the higher rate of profit of 
colonial zed regions, as well as, tariff protection inside this region permitting to sell at 
monopoly prices.    
             The road to associate monopoly with imperialism and war ruling out the possibility of 
Ultra Monopoly argued by Kautsky is now wide open.   
 
«The capitalists divide the world... And they divide it “in proportion to capital”, “in 
proportion to strength”, because there cannot be any other method of division under 
commodity production and capitalism. But strength varies with the degree of economic and 
political development. ....The question as to whether these changes [in power-NS] are 
“purely” economic or non-economic (e.g., military) is a secondary one, which cannot in the 
least affect fundamental views on the latest epoch of capitalism.... the form of the struggle and 
agreements (today peaceful, tomorrow warlike, the next day warlike again) for the question of 
the substance of the struggle and agreements between capitalist associations is to sink to the 
role of a sophist [he refers to Kautsky-NS]»  
 
Since competition has ceased, the struggle is settled «in proportion to strength». 
Whether this strength comes from the magnitude of financial capital and monopoly power or 
the power of canons is a «secondary matter», because these structures are correlated. Instead 
of considering competition in capitalism as war (in the context of which actual warfare can 
certainly take place), Lenin assumes that war replaces capitalist competition and any 
«agreement» between capitalists in this context is a transient truce, because development is 
«uneven» both among the strong, as well as, between the strong and the weak. It varies «with 
the degree of economic and political development», in other words, with the degree of 
monopolization of each national economy. As capital concentration proceeds inside national 
borders and monopoly combinations emerge fresh capital accumulates in bank vaults seeking 
employment outside the country, any fragile balance reached thus far is shaken and the 
«drums of war» are heard again.    
 Seeking new markets and investment territory is a main counteracting tendency to 
the decline of the rate of profit as presented in Capital VIII (Marx 1894
18
) and therefore 
persistently implemented by capitalists at all times and with every mean. Imperialism is thus 
an existing although not distinctive aspect of capitalism, since it appears in earlier modes of 
production. War on the other hand appears in all class societies due to breakdown between 
forces of production and social relations. In the context of the capitalist mode of production 
such breakdown incurs when, due to decline in the rate of profit, the process of production 
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does not reflect in the process of valorization (Grossman 1929
7
), in other words in a 
depression. Crises are times when war comes to the top of the agenda as a possible resolution, 
WWII being a relevant historical example. Lenin came to the need to apply Neoclassical 
Monopoly theory as an explanation of imperialism because he had failed to grasp the 
underlying argument in Marx as noted in the first section and because monopoly theory could 
provide a clear argument justifying immediate revolutionary action in backward countries. 
But the partition from Marxist political economy was not without consequence. The 
substitution of the social relations of capitalist production by monopoly power signaled the 
partition of the revolutionary left with the work class movement especially in advanced 
countries. The immanent necessity of socialism was reduced to the war inclined nature of the 
«highest state of capitalism» and/or the liberation of backward countries, colonies and semi- 
colonies from imperialist exploitation.       
 Liberation  from imperialist exploitation, which actually meant liberation from a 
vicious cycle of retrogression,  was used to justify a shift of the revolutionary terrain from 
advanced capitalist countries to backward exploited nations Diverting from Hilferding who 
suggests that growth is retarded because monopoly curtails capacity, Lenin suggests with 
reference to Britain and in a perfectly neoclassical fashion, that monopoly is not keen to 
technical change because the monopolist feels secure from his dominant position. This 
tendency is reinforced by the emergence of a whole class of financial capitalists acting as 
passive renters unable «to influence socio-economic conditions». The same people who few 
lines above were colluding with governments, fueling wars, exploiting colonies, dividing the 
world, just to employ their excess capital are now appearing as redundant usurers of financial 
capital exploiting «debtor states». Here Lenin inserts his second point: the redundant capitalist 
class corrupts a part of the national working class to preserve its dominance. The working 
class is split between a «labor aristocracy» enjoying privileges from belonging to the 
exploiting nation and «proletariat proper». This privileged position is the material basis for 
the attraction of this part of the working class by the center and the right faction of the old 
international. Lenin thus argues that the split of the 2nd international was a political reflection 
of social developments in the working class at the «stage of imperialism». The monopoly 
model and its interpretation by Lenin, acted again in a misleading fashion, the beginning of 
the fall of Britain as the leading capitalist nation was conceived as redundancy of advanced 
capitalism. Moreover politically experienced work class forces were handed over to the new 
social democracy as labor aristocracy. And when capitalism broke down in the 1930’s, an 
event ruled out by monopoly theory, these forces turned their back to the left and followed the 
extreme right with devastating consequences. 
Although most of the views initially presented by Bukharin are incorporated by Lenin 
and have been elaborated above, the former presents also a theory of «state capitalism» where 
the state, in the stage of imperialism, appears as a collective capitalist. This idea received 
criticism by Lenin and also played part in the formation of the right wing of the Bolshevik 
party in the 1920’s, thus it needs specific mention. The argument is wrapped up in the 
following extract:   
     
«A self-sufficient national state, and an economic unit limitlessly expending its great power 
until it becomes a world kingdom - a world-wide empire - such is the ideal built up by finance 
capital. 
 
«With a steady and clear eye does it [finance capital] view the Babylonian confusion of 
peoples, and above all of them it sees its own nation. The latter is real; it lives in a powerful 
state, which keeps on increasing its power and grandeur, and which devotes all its forces to 
making them greater. In this way, the interests of the individual are subjugated to the interests 
of the whole-a condition without which no social ideology can live; a nation and a state that 
are hostile to the people are tied into one whole, and the national idea, as a motive power, is 
subjugated to politics. The class conflicts have disappeared; they have been annihilated, 
absorbed as they are in serving the interests of the whole. In place of the dangerous class 
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struggle, fraught for the owners with unknown consequences, there appear the general actions 
of the nation which is united by one aim-the striving for national grandeur» 
 
Thus the interests of finance capital acquire a grandiose ideological formulation; every effort 
is made to inculcate it into the mass of workers, for, as a German imperialist has correctly 
remarked from his point of view: "We must gain power not only over the legs of the soldiers, 
but also over their minds and hearts."» (Bukharin ch. 8
17
) 
 
Most probably confused by the application of a command war economy, from  the 
conflicting sides of WWI, Bukharin arrived to the conclusion that the national «general 
cartel» suggested by Hilferding had been reached by 1915 and this fact had effected, as 
argued in the extract from «Finance Capital» sited, a change in the nature of capitalist state. 
Class conflict had disappeared annihilated in the «ideological formulation» of «national 
grandeur». Contradictions were transferred to the world market emerging from the «world- 
wide basis» of social economy and the national acquisition of social value. The state, in its 
capacity as «collective capitalist», effects through war the resolution of this contradiction.    
Lenin did not criticize Bukharin openly, but contested his view in «Imperialism», 
most probably becoming aware of the implications of Bukharin’s position during the émigré 
conference of 1915. He argued that the disproportional sector development, of national 
economy, (especially between industry and agriculture) is inherent in imperialism. Thus the 
anarchic character of national capitalist development does not vanish, effecting shifts in 
power relations and the prevalence of war. His appeal to the parasitical nature of imperialism 
can be viewed as an extension of this argument since it reinforces the tendency towards power 
shifts between imperialist nations. These theoretical differences explain also the absence of 
any express reference to Bukharin’s book in Lenin’s pamphlet.  
The Bolsheviks were able to reach a compromise on their differences in the émigré 
conference resolution, placing the powerful idea of transforming the imperialist war to civil 
war as their primary duty. This, Marxist notion would guide them in the years until October 
1917 and is mainly responsible for their success.   
However, by 1916, the adoption of the Hilferding model had turned the discussion on 
the inherently contradictory dynamics of capitalism to a superficial debate on Monopoly, 
Ultra Monopoly, Organized State Capitalism, Decay and Labor Aristocracy. These trivial 
assertions were applied, at the level of national politics to justify, the revolutionary 
destruction of the capitalist state for the Bolsheviks, or the apprehension of this state of 
«organized capitalism» and its rectification in favor of the work class by the new social 
democrats. At the level of international politics, a new era of imperialist wars and revolutions 
stood in front of the world labor movement for the Bolsheviks, whereas, for the new social 
democrats, peacekeeping multinational integrations like Kautsky’s «United States of Europe» 
should be pursued.  
Both factions of the old international soon experienced political success. The 
Bolsheviks made world history with the October 1917 insurrection. The USPD
4
 managed to 
prevail from the events following the «Kiel up rise», which led to the removal of the Kaiser 
and formed a government with the «Majority Social Democrats» in November 1918. 
However, the above mentioned, superficial notions continued to dominate the theoretical 
debates and political practice of both factions.  
For the USPD the idea of taking over an «organized capitalism» state was proven 
naïve even before the formation of the government. They were called to govern a bankrupt 
state where production had deteriorated because of the war and where huge war 
compensations could only be paid out of excessive quantitative easing. Following some pro 
labor reforms which served only to ease discontent among the population their collision 
                                                 
4
 The acronym stands for United Social Democrats. This party was formed by old SPD members who 
left the SPD during the war. USPD included the major figures referred in this paper (Kautsky, 
Bernstein, Hilferding) as well the revolutionary faction «Spartacus League» led by Rosa Luxemburg 
and Karl Liebknecht.  
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speedily deteriorated, through a sequence of splits and betrayals ending with their 
marginalization in the January 1919 election. The tragic victims of their policy were: first the 
revolutionary faction Spartacus, then Germany and the whole world in the end.  
But also the politically aware Bolsheviks did not escape the gap in their economic 
understanding while dealing with the great challenges facing their revolution. The theoretical 
differences, we are able to trace, as early as 1915 evolved in a fierce superficial political 
struggle throughout the second decade of the 20th century from which the faction caring the 
least about theory and the most about clinging to power reasonably prevailed. To these 
theoretical queries we will now turn.  
 
IV.  Trotsky – Kondratiev and the Breakdown of world capitalism:   
 
The third conference of the Comintern took place in Moscow in 1921, the mood was 
far from being enthusiastic. Although, the Bolsheviks had practically prevailed in the civil 
war since 1920 the economic conditions in revolutionary Russia were devastating. After 
seven consecutive years of war and four years of war economy (war communism) output had 
declined by about 80%, compared to prewar levels, industry was mostly idle because of oil 
and coal crisis, high unemployment, famine and disease were present especially in the cities 
leading half of their population to leave for rural areas in search of food and jobs. Political 
unrest emerged, quite reasonably, reaching a climax in the Kronstadt uprising (1921) which 
was brutally put down by the Red Army. The Bolshevik party responded to the situation by 
abandoning «war communism», reestablishing market relations and private enterprise under 
the bumper sticker of «state capitalism» (10th Congress1921). The new policy has been 
recorded in history with the acronym N.E.P (New Economic Policy) to which we will refer 
bellow in some extend. 
In the international level, the revolutionary tide of 1919, which embraced almost all 
European countries, was in a setback. Although economic growth which followed the war by 
1920 had turned to a world capitalism crisis, the defeat of the revolution in Germany and 
Hungary, the defeat of the red army in Warsaw and the stabilization of the post war political 
scene had raised skepticism amid the parties of the Comintern. The idea that the Russian 
revolution would become the sparkle of world revolution was not held with the same 
conviction as a year earlier. The Bolsheviks were uncertain of the ability of the European 
parties to lead revolution to victory and the «brother parties» were skeptical of the policy shift 
of the Bolsheviks (NEP), the later seeking restoration of state and economic relations with the 
capitalist world i.e. the national adversaries of the «brother parties». In this atmosphere 
Trotsky
5
 delivered the «Report on the World Economic Crisis and the New Tasks of the 
Communist International» (Trotsky & Vega 192119) to the third conference.  
At first, showing insight missing from all of his contemporaries, Trotsky suggested 
that equilibrium in capitalism is not a static phenomenon but a turbulent process where 
balance is reached through the succession of boom and crisis periods. However, like 
Hilferding, he limits this process to the ten year cycle, suggesting that this is the inherent 
economic crisis in capitalism resulting from disproportional growth between: sector I (means 
of production), sector II (means of consumption). Then he shows further insight by suggesting 
that these short term fluctuations take place in the context of a «long wave» of capitalist 
development. But at this point he loses perceptiveness and suggests that the downturn of the 
«long wave» resulted from a disruption in capitalist «inter-state equilibrium» which was no 
                                                 
5
 Leo Trotsky was a late and important arrival in the Bolshevik camp. His enlistment was associated 
with Lenin’s «April Theses» (Lenin 1917) where Trotsky saw the adoption of his theory of «Permanent 
Revolution» (Trotsky 1902). In the light of unequal development between capitalist nations, the 
bourgeoisie of backward countries is unable to play its historical mission and any democratic 
revolution has to be performed by the labor class and transformed to a proletarian revolution. Lenin’s 
appeal: «all power to the soviets», following the overthrow of the tsar, was the invitation signal for 
Trotsky to join the Bolshevik party, soon becoming a prominent figure for his part in the days of 
October and the civil war which followed. 
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other than WWI. The war, argues Trotsky, disrupted the proportionality between sectors I and 
II because war needs pushed all major war powers to produce means of production instead of 
means of consumption. This in turn disrupted the class equilibrium between «centralized 
unions» and «centralized industrial capital» and equilibrium between capitalist states in the 
sense that power shifted from the traditional European powers, especially Britain, to the 
United States. Capitalism is unable to restore a positive long term development trend, because 
the prolonged duration of WWI «destroyed Europe’s economic apparatus», which means also 
reduced demand from Europe for American products in the post war era and thus growth 
retardation and crisis for the United States as well. The overall picture of capitalist dynamics 
are summarized in the following extract and chart two the later appearing in a 1923 article: 
     
«It is quite obvious that America will have to suffer curtailment since the European war 
market is gone beyond recall. On the other hand, Europe will likewise have to level herself 
out in accordance with the most backward, i.e., the most ruined areas and branches of 
industry. This will mean an economic leveling out in reverse, and, consequently, a prolonged 
crisis: in some branches of economy and some countries – stagnation; in others – a weak 
development. Cyclical fluctuations will continue to take place but, in general, the curve of 
capitalist development will slope not upwards but downwards» (Trotsky 1921)  
 
    
                                   
The association of the transition from growth to depression with war is an application 
of the Hilferding model, where Trotsky’s extends Lenin’s argument in Imperialism. This is 
indicated in his 1923 article:  
 
«As regards the large segments of the capitalist curve of development (fifty years) which 
Professor Kondratiev incautiously proposes to designate also as cycles, their character and 
duration are determined not by the internal interplay of capitalist forces but by those external 
conditions through whose channel capitalist development flows. The acquisition by capitalism 
of new countries and continents, the discovery of new natural resources, and, in the wake of 
these, such major facts of “superstructural” order as wars and revolutions, determine the 
character and the replacement of ascending, stagnating or declining epochs of capitalist 
development». 
 
Following Lenin, who argues that capitalist growth leads to monopolization, which 
triggers capital export, power shifts, war and revolution, Trotsky suggests, that these «facts of 
superstructural order... determine the ...ascending, stagnating or declining epochs of capitalist 
development». In other words WWI marked the beginning of a long period of decline for 
world capitalism. On these grounds He criticizes N. Kondratiev, a prominent Russian 
economist and statistician of the time, appointed by the Bolsheviks head of the Moscow 
«Institute of Conjuncture» in 1920, for attempting to explain the long cycle in economic 
terms. 
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In the aftermath of the third conference of the Comintern where the prospects of 
«world revolution» were associated with a declining trend in capitalist development, 
Kondratiev presented a paper (Kondratiev 1922) where using actual data he showed that long 
term cycles (long waves) were recurrent phenomena in the history of capitalism the beginning 
of the first long cycle dated as back as 1790. Although, Kondratiev in subsequent work 
(Kondratiev 1926) expressly stated that the crisis of 1920 marked a period of long-term 
decline in world capitalism, as suggested also by Trotsky for different reasons, what was the 
need for Trotsky to oppose him strongly? In other words why was it so important for a long 
wave to depend on superstructural random occurrences rather than being the result of the 
inherent tendency of the rate of profit to fall, which was what Kondratiev was actually 
observing (Mandel 1980). 
 The main reason was that the Kondratiev findings implied that capitalism was 
capable of restoring growth following a declining period. Trotsky thought that by applying 
the idea of an irreversible downturn, at the absence of positive random events in favor of 
world capitalism, he was supporting the notion that WWI marked the beginning of the period 
of revolution first in Europe and then around the globe. This was, in His view, a prerequisite 
for the prevalence of socialism and the survival of the Russian revolution itself given the 
backwardness of Russia and imperialist surrounding of the soviet state. Although, He was 
obviously correct in the last assertion, the application of the Monopoly model as basis of the 
argument led himself and part of the Comintern to a witch hunt on an immanent new war 
emerging from British, U.S. rivalry. When this war did not come in 1924, as anticipated by 
some Comintern members (not Trotsky), but only in 1939, His inter-party rivals were given 
ample time to attack the core of his argument and establish their power on Russian national 
development. 
                                   
V. The Bolshevik Party struggle 1923 – 1928 and the Third Period of the Comintern: 
 
In the 10th congress of the Russian communist party Lenin made his appeal for the 
application of the «N.E.P.» on two grounds: 1) that the revolution was «marking time» in 
anticipation of the insurrection of the European proletariat, 2) the application of «state 
capitalism» in the transition from capitalism to socialism. 
 The first part of the argument was commonplace in the party (at the time), Trotsky 
analyzed it further making it one of the cornerstones of the «left opposition». The underlying 
assertion was that Russia could not overcome its backwardness on its own. Unequal 
development is inherent in capitalism thus in backward countries only revolution in the west 
can supplement it with «dual development» through technological infusion coming from the 
European proletariat. In the meantime the revolution should make the best of this «breathing 
spell». In this context the NEP was designed to establish proportionality between the 
industrial and agrarian sector, in other words market relations were restored to regenerate 
economic relations between city and countryside. Disproportional sectoral development was 
the inherent economic contradiction of the capitalist system for all the theorists of the old and 
new international, especially Lenin who had argued that the anarchic character of capitalist 
production does not vanish in «Imperialism». In the case of Russia this implied rapid 
industrialization, since the agrarian sector was immensely greater. To avoid capitalist 
restoration, industrialization should be undertaken by the state the latter organizing industrial 
production through central planning.  
The second appeal is an extension of the Bukharin argument, stated in section (III) 
War had converted «Monopoly Capitalism» to «state capitalism» and «state capitalism» is «a 
step towards the regulation of economic life as a whole, in accordance with a certain general 
plan, a step towards the economy of national labor and towards the prevention of its senseless 
wastage by capitalism» (Lenin 1917). This second appeal together with Lenin’s conference 
statement that the NEP would have to go on for decades (Lenin’s 10th conference address) 
served as the basis of the right wing faction (Bukharin, Rykov). The «right» took Lenin’s 
position literally i.e. first we build state capitalism and then we move to socialism. These are 
the inherent dynamics of capitalist economies but also the «stages of the socialist revolution». 
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Trotsky in his theory of «permanent revolution» underestimated the socialist potentialities of 
the peasantry and this led him to his flowed conception that socialist Russia will come 
following an up rise in the West (Bukharin 1924). For the world agenda, the «right» preached, 
that economic downturn of world capitalism, as shown in Trotsky’s chart, is by no means 
irreversible. Capitalism and especially state capitalism was perfectly capable of reversing 
economic decline (Bukharin 1927), it was the contradictions in the world arena, originally 
argued by Bukharin in his 1915 book, which will bring war and the end of capitalism. The 
bottom-line was that socialism could materialize in Russia alone but at the «peasants pace».      
These were the actual conflicting lines in the Bolshevik party practically in place 
since 1921, although their views were concretized in various documents throughout the inter-
party struggle. Both were equally superficial, the first put the fate of the revolution in the 
hands of the war inclined nature of capitalism and the second in ideations that small, middle, 
large peasants and entrepreneurs will be annexed into socialism in the same fashion that 
monopoly annexes non cartelized sectors in Hilferding.   
Between them rested a mass of party middle and high officials, public servants, the 
army etc. who were prepared to discuss any course of action that would not compromise the 
Bolshevik rule which they associated with their own privileges. The left opposition posed a 
danger for them because it placed their fate in the hands of world revolution and the right an 
equal danger placing their fate in the hands of yesterday enemies like the kulaks, or hostile 
liberal elements like the “nepmen”. Stalin with articulate and well-timed moves applied, in 
the end, the “secure” parts of both lines: first he took «socialism in one country» from the 
right and afterwards central planning from the left. When the «socialist inclined» peasants did 
not enter collectivization willingly, he «solved» the problem in his own way. 
Evaluating the inter-party struggle some years following its end (1928), Trotsky 
suggested that the non-revolutionary circumstances of the mid 20’s were the main reason for 
the prevalence of Stalin’s center.  This position certainly has merit but cannot serve as an 
explanation, the left opposition burned its case not in 1928, when it was politically 
marginalized, but much earlier (1923) when it was preaching international revolution to a 
starving population which was trying to obtain mere means of subsistence. It was the 
superficiality of this assertion, emerging from the conviction of an imminent new war, which 
gave the upper hand of “political realism” to the center and the right both inside party but also 
in the population.  
Superficiality of a different kind was the reason of the political defeat of the right in 
1928. By 1928 the N.E.P had exhausted its potential, although agricultural production had 
reached or exceeded prewar levels since 1926 the continuation of this policy implied an 
agrarian economy running current account deficits in order to finance industrialization, 
something which implied further severe compromises to international capital. While the right 
was talking «thin air» about the gradual annexation of Kulaks to socialism, the center having 
in mind the uncompromised Bolshevik rule understood that the N.E.P. had to be abandoned. 
Clinking on the path breaking work of Gregory Feldman on economic development, which 
overruled the neoclassical conviction that each country should develop relying on the 
«production factor» in abundance and suggesting alternatively  growth through social savings 
as means to industrialization the “center” turned” towards central planning and rapid 
industrialization introducing a period of strong growth which lasted for next generation. 
Growth rates for soviet Russia exceeded those of the capitalist world and the economic 
supremacy of planned “socialism” over market capitalism became the word of the day.  
Besides the consequences of this bitter struggle on soviet Russia and the local 
communist party, the 1920’s had even more tragic consequences for European and world 
politics in the years to come. In 1928 when Bukharin was still leading the Comintern and the 
general conviction was that world capitalism had recovered from postwar crises the 
organization introduced a political line which has gone down to history as the “third period”. 
Since socialism could materialize in separate countries national revolutionary policies were 
designed. Based on the law of “unequal development”, countries were divided to backward, 
middle development and developed countries. Revolution, which was considered as the norm 
at the “age of imperialism”, was assigned a different character in each group of countries, 
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which in turn justified different political and social alliances. In backward countries a general 
alliance including the capitalist class was justified to remove feudalist laws and institutions 
and bring about a nation state. On these grounds the Chinese communists were instructed to 
abandon their own political objectives and place their forces under the command of the 
cominwang in the struggle against the Manchu dynasty, an event which led to their slaughter 
by Chan Khai Sek following his prevalence. In countries of middle development the 
revolution would develop from the initial democratic stage, which would serve as an action of 
national independence from imperialist exploitation, to the socialist stage. National 
bourgeoisie was excluded from the revolutionary alliance, in this group of countries, since it 
was considered totally dependent to imperialist interests. Finally, in developed countries 
socialist revolution was the immediate task and “proletariat proper” as opposed to “labor 
aristocracy” the heart of revolutionary action, although social alliances with exploited social 
groups could be justified. However no political alliances were appropriate, conservatives 
parties were the enemy and social democrats were only spreading confusion in the 
revolutionary movement. 
Months following the publication of the “third period” policies capitalism broke 
down. The “great depression” was felt more strongly in developed capitalist nations, first in 
the U.S., where it was triggered and then in Europe. Although the Comintern soon 
acknowledged this fact it made no modifications in its policies, on the contrary they simply 
considered the event as justification of immediate revolutionary action using the immunity of 
the Soviet Union to the crisis as an additional argument in that direction. Crisis was not 
considered as the decisive revolutionary sparkle for the parties of the Comintern, revolution 
was present-day task because of the contradictions in the era of imperialism as presented in 
Lenin’s “Imperialism”. Paying no attention to the political circumstances in Europe, 
especially in Germany which was the most prominent revolutionary terrain, no intermediate 
political program to face the devastation of the crisis was initiated and no political alliances 
were pursued. The goal of this sectarian policy was to undermine the SPD, deprive it from its 
relation with the labor class and the labor movement, in the same fashion that the Bolsheviks 
were attacking the Cadets and the Mensheviks in the days between the removal of the Tsar 
and the October revolution. But circumstances were dramatically different from those of 
revolutionary Russia, people were in desperate need for solutions from the devastation of the 
crisis and what they were given instead was a general condemnation of capitalism and its 
political representatives. At the same time the SPD, governing party at the time, was put 
under no actual political pressure since this policy involved no political and economic policy 
alternatives but only extremely hostile political language epitomized in the word “social-
fascists” used by the German communist party for the SPD. The results were the exact 
opposite than those anticipated for the communists, Ebert social democrats, who understood 
their political usefulness in preventing the communists from coming to power, found the 
perfect excuse to incriminate any left critique to their policies as coming from the Bolsheviks 
and rule the party unchallenged.  
The inability of both social democrats and communists to forward any persuasive 
alternative to the crisis either at the level of the government or the labor movement led to the 
prevalence of an extremist right wing party which used affiliations with the capitalist class to 
provide jobs for its members, distribute food to the starving as well as the fear of communism 
to build alliances and tolerance from the liberals and the social democrats. What followed is 
well known. 
Irrespective of the political environment of the time the understanding of the crisis by 
both main currents of the left certainly played an important part in the outcome. For the SPD 
the crisis was simply an unfortunate random event since capitalism was understood as an ever 
growing system for all factions of the party. As quoted by Grossman (Grossman 1929
6
), 
Hilferding spent most of his 1928 conference speech to convince the conference that no 
“breakdown theory” was implied in his writings. Therefore any resolution was understood 
only inside the capitalist mode of production. For the Bolshevik faction(s) which prevailed 
from the inter-party struggle the crisis was at best a severe ten year cycle which would distort 
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inter- imperialist state balances triggering a destructive general war that would mark the end 
of capitalism. The center understood this position most cynically following a line of non-
intervention for the greatest part of the 1930’s which rested on the conviction that the 
imperialist war would weaken all major imperialist powers paving the way for the socialist 
revolution. It was only for the brief period between 1933 and the Molotov-Ribbentrop 
agreement that the Comintern under Georgy Dimitrov would intervene decisively in European 
politics through the “popular front” line which succeeded both in Spain and France. But it 
was already too late fascism was already well established, the left lost the Spanish civil war 
fighting against the concerted forces of fascist Europe who supported Franco and France 
collapsed at the first stages of WWII. 
Nevertheless the stage argument, presented in the versions or applications of the 
Hilferding model presented so far, outlived these tragic events and remained an integral part 
of soviet politics and western Marxist literature through the works of Paul Baran and Paul 
Sweezy throughout the 20
th
 century. But most astonishingly the stage argument is attempting 
a comeback in modern heterodox literature as we elaborate below.                  
                        
VI. The Modern Return: 
 
Although the Soviet Union is history for the last twenty years and the labor 
movement has been weak for the past generation, capitalism entered a depression in 2007, the 
first in the new century, proving the systemic inherent tendency to produce long waves as a 
recurring pattern in its development.  
The outburst of the crisis was preceded by an upturn which commenced around 1980 
following the previous depression of the 70’s, intervened by two major recessions in 1990 and 
the millennium. Triggering the upturn was the severe deregulation of the labor market and the 
demolition of the postwar welfare state, this, stabilized the rate of profit which was declining 
during the preceding decades. However, the rate of profit did not rise to support growth and 
for this reason, labor market deregulation was coupled by strong financial deregulation which, 
together with low central bank intervention rates, depressed interest rates and boosted the 
«rate of profit of enterprise» (rate of profit less interest rate). Growth was restored, but 
deregulated finance markets together with low debt service costs and «financial innovation», 
lead to an unprecedented accumulation of debt and immense growth of the financial sector 
accompanied by modest growth of the corporate sector. This phenomenon is referred to as 
«financialization of capital» (Stravelakis 201220). Disregarding the rate of profit factor in this 
process a good deal of heterodox economists have suggested that «financialization» has 
implemented a qualitative change in the structure and dynamics of capitalist economies in the 
same fashion Hilferding suggested that the appearance of centralized banks, cartels and trusts, 
following the depression of 1870-1890, had converted the nature of 20th century capitalism.    
The application of Hilferding’s methodological example is either direct, i.e. «Finance 
Capital» was the first attempt to explain the actualities of a new financial capitalism 
(Lapavitsas 2009
1
, Sweezy 1997
2
), or indirect in the sense that every long cycle involves 
prevalence and death of a «capitalist institutional structure» (Kotz 200821), neoliberal 
financialized capitalism being the «structure» in crisis. We will restrain ourselves to the first 
category of arguments since we wish to explore the implications Hilferding’s revival. 
The obvious question is: what insights in monetary theory and finance are included in 
«Finance Capital» to facilitate our understanding of the current crisis? Let us begin with the 
rate of interest. In chapter 6 following a passage of supreme novelty where, in contrast to any 
known economist, Hilferding suggests that the demand for circulating medium drains the gold 
reserve triggering a rise of central Bank discount rate, which in turn boosts market interest 
rates during economic expansion, he abandons any analytical effort and reaches the following 
conclusion: 
 
«In a developed capitalist system, the rate of interest is fairly stable, while the rate of profit 
declines, and in consequence the share of interest in the total profit increases to some extent at 
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the expense of entrepreneurial profit. In other words, the share of rentiers grows at the 
expense of productive capitalists, a phenomenon which does indeed contradict the dogma of 
the falling interest rate, but nevertheless accords with the facts. It is also a cause of the 
growing influence and importance of interest-bearing capital, that is to say, of the banks, and 
one of the main levers for effecting the transformation of capital into finance capital» 
(Hilferding 1910 Ch6) 
 
Remarking, in passing, that in the period preceding the current crisis the rate of 
interest declined from 20% in 1980 to around 2% in 2007, we take note of the basic 
conclusions: 1) the rate of interest is relatively stable, 2) that this stability relative to the 
declining rate of profit brings about the growing influence of Banks and the prevalence of 
«finance capital».  
But what is «finance capital»?  It is the fusion of industrial and financial capital 
through the holding of ownership stakes by Banks in industrial joint stock companies. 
However, given the stability of the rate of interest and the declining rate of profit assumption, 
Banks have no reason to hold stakes in industrial companies while appropriating through 
interest an increasing portion of their profits. It is at this point that the second part of 
Hilferding’s argument, discussed above, comes into play. With capital concentration, the 
alleged prevalence of monopoly and the consequent reversal of profit rates, interest earnings 
accumulated by Banks during the competitive era find their way into industry.  
Noting, again in passing, the remark of Kotz that «neoliberal capitalism» is marked 
by «large corporations with unrestrained competition [emphasis added – NS] » (Kotz 
2008
21
), we move to the next question. How do bonds and shares qualify as compared to 
fixed and circulating capital advanced? They are claims on future revenue discounted against 
a required rate of return, a «fictitious capital». This is roughly the position in Marx as well, 
but Hilferding has made an additional assumption that the required rate of return (in his case 
the rate of interest) is «fairly stable». In the Hilferding world the rate of interest is the 
minimum rate of profit (the rate of profit towards which the non-cartelized sector is pushed by 
monopoly) bellow which production stops. Which valuation model applies in this world? Of 
course the family of dividend discount, discounted cash flows (DCF) or discounted earnings 
models where, because perfect competition and perfect markets are assumed, the required rate 
of return remains in line with the rate of interest which is the neoclassical uniform risk free 
rate of profit.  
In this imaginary world Banks have a strong incentive to take equity stakes in 
monopoly sectors thereby realizing a «promoters’ profit», approximating the difference 
between nominal and market equity value, which exceeds the rate of interest they would 
otherwise earn. Industrial capitalists, on the other hand, are happy to give away a part of their 
capital gain since their «capital intensive concerns» cannot be financed otherwise due to the 
great amount needed for their establishment. Thus monopolization on the one hand and the 
«fairly stable» rate of interest on the other bring both industry and finance in the hands of a 
«financial oligarchy» and transforms capitalist relations as suggested by Lenin in 
Imperialism. All this in appearance because in practice we have a theory of neoclassical 
monopoly coupled by elements of «modern investment theory».  
Is there any relevance in these assertions regarding the operation of capital markets? 
The almost unanimous answer is no. It was 1983 when the mainstream economist Robert 
Shiller (Shiller 1983
22
) showed that profit or dividend variations cannot explain stock price 
volatility. This implied that the required rate of return is not stable but highly variable. Banks 
and financial capitalists are constantly adjusting their equity holdings to match the 
incremental rate of profit of the corporate sector (Shaikh 1994
23
) which because of capitalist 
competition is a highly volatile measure. This is why financial capitalists have proved quite 
reluctant to hold controlling stakes in industry for long.  
The almost stable «promoters’ profit» implied by Hilferding has further implications. 
Financial crises are very unlikely in His world, since «monopoly combinations» can keep 
most of their activity in place during a recession and utilize accumulated reserves. Because of 
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this, corporations, by substituting bank credit with commercial credit, release funds enabling 
banks to keep credit flowing (Hilferding ch 20).        
 Although Hilferding’s framework is most inadequate in explaining crisis especially 
financial crisis, heterodox economists found great insight in «promoters profit» for 
elucidating «financialization» and the present depression. Financialization emerged from a 
«Sweezy surplus» (a version of monopoly surplus), accumulated during the golden years of 
the 60s’ which ended in bank vaults during the crisis of the 70s’.  Large corporations became 
increasingly independent of corporate bank credit because of accumulated reserves and the 
ability to assemble leverage through bonds and commercial paper issues. In this context 
Banks undertook a restructuring in their activities focusing in revenue from underwriting 
corporate stock and bond issues as well as financing consumer spending (mortgages, 
consumer durables etc.). This way finance fused into the whole society creating a new set of 
economic and social relations. 
 But how crisis emerged in this context? The advocates of this theory (Lapavitsas  
2009
1
) suggest that because corporate investment and public debt issues decelerated in all 
major capitalist countries (Why?), banks, in search of other sources of profits, implemented 
financial innovation, enabling them to dispose mortgages through securitized titles (mortgage 
backed securities) acquiring fresh funds allocated in additional consumer credit of lower 
quality. Credit inflation drove prices up creating the U.S. «housing bubble». When an 
increased amount of mortgagees stopped performing on their loans, because of the limit posed 
by wages, the bubble burst. However, this is not a crisis theory it is an account of events 
which led to the collapse of the sub-prime market in the U.S. triggering the current 
depression.  
To establish an underlying crisis theory we have to identify the cause of corporate 
investment slowdown. Moreover, since the proponents of these theories insist in dissociating 
the present crisis from profitability we need a theory of dissociation of profitability from 
investment in other to identify the independent dynamics of financialization which led to it. 
The most obvious explanation, given the background provided, is that increased 
monopolization in the 70s led to an increasing surplus, in the sense of accumulated 
neoclassical monopoly economic profit, facing insufficient demand (Sweezy 1997
2
). This is 
the under consumption version of the Hilferding argument initially advanced by Luxemburg 
and Kautsky, subsequently elaborated by Kalecki and mainly by Baran and Sweezy. Banks 
employed the economic surplus creating adequate demand, through consumer credit, to close 
the «demand gap» which undermines economic growth in capitalism. Besides the obvious 
criticism i.e. profit and not consumption, is the driver of capitalist production, financialization 
in this case is not the cause of the crisis. The cause lies in the corporate sector, like all under 
consumption theories Sweezy suggests that capitalism is not capable of sustaining growth, 
growth comes outside the production process, therefore growing finance is not an impediment 
to growth, on the contrary «[growth] has been almost entirely due to the financial explosion» 
(Magdoff and Sweezy 1987
24
). 
 Under the above reasoning, financialization does not constitute a new stage of 
capitalism it is the result of the inherently stagnant nature of «under consumption monopoly 
capitalism». To support a theory of crisis resulting from financialization the causality must be 
reversed, high financial returns reduced funds destined for corporate investment and /or 
higher investments requiring greater financial payments are responsible for investment 
slowdown In other words although the profit rate is sufficiently high to sustain growth 
unproductive financial investments place a burden. Sociological features suggesting the 
prevalence of a class of renters and “usurers” of capital, like those presented by Lenin in 
“Imperialism”, serve now as explanation of the disproportional growth of finance which is 
prone in creating bubbles the latter serving as the cause of crisis. These developments, in turn, 
have implemented a shift of power between “agents”, unproductive usurers become dominant 
associated and supported by the state, central banks etc., thereby persistently undermining 
growth and increasing the probability of financial crisis episodes. 
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Both versions of the argument are directly related with the ideas presented in 
Hilferding and Lenin which expressly rely on the idea that disproportional growth between 
sectors is the cause of crisis in capitalism. The only difference is that crisis was understood 
back then as the ten year cycle and now as a sequence of highly probable financial crisis 
episodes. If proportionality between sectors, in our case production and finance, could be 
restored through state intervention then capitalism could sustain growth to eternity (Husson 
2008
25
).         
The absence of a depression theory inherent in the mode of production haunts the 
policy suggestions forwarded by this set of theories in proximity to the debates of the first 
decades of the previous century. Since a financially regulated capitalism would be immune 
against crisis, bank regulation is the answer one could argue. But it can be argued also that the 
dominance of finance capital over states, governments and central banks is so great that this 
attempt is a fallacy similar to Kautsky’s “Ultra Monopoly”. At a time when billions all-over 
the globe are facing the consequences of a brutal class policy designed to restore the rate of 
profit to growth sustainable levels, a process which seems to move in slow pace, undermined 
by severe contradictions relating to the sustainability of the financial system, heterodox 
economics have surrendered the economic policy agenda to mainstream theorists. It is 
neoclassical economists supporting the fiscal austerity agenda and Keynesian or neo 
Keynesian economists suggesting that “austerity policies” are in fact responsible for the 
duration of the crisis who monopolize economic policy debates.   Heterodox economists have 
restrained themselves in “witch hunt” over whether the present crisis will mark the end of 
financialized capitalism or whether we are witnessing the first major crisis at the era of 
financialization. 
 
VII Summary and Conclusions: 
 
Looking back in history through the “eyes” of the dominant political economy model 
is by no means a complete historical analysis it can serve however as an analytical tool 
identifying the rationale underlying practices, policies and actions in the minds of the 
“leading actors” which, at certain times, play important part in the historical outcome. 
The Hilferding model is by far the leading candidate to hold the term “dominant 
model” when it comes down to the left. Nevertheless contrary to mainstream economic 
models which appear as solution during crises, the monopoly model becomes completely 
irrelevant at depression times, that is at times when the left is expected to dominate and the 
reason is that it does not include an inherent depression theory. The ability of capitalism to 
restore growth following depression episodes was viewed by Hilferding as the ability of 
capitalism to resolve its inherent contradictions and this last result was analytically argued by 
applying to the neoclassical theory of competition and elements of “modern investment 
theory” as shown above. The anarchy of production remained the only crisis creating element 
leading to disproportional growth between sectors or countries in a world dominated by 
power relations as argued by Lenin in “Imperialism”. 
We saw the part played by this understanding of the dynamics of capitalism in 
political struggles in the left during the first three decades of the previous century, reaching a 
climax during the “third period” of the Comintern. At those critical times the inability of all 
factions of the left to understand the cause of the “great depression”, in other words the 
inherently contradictory dynamics of growth under capitalism, deprived them of a persuasive 
economic program that could meet people’s needs and even pave the way for overcoming 
capitalism. This together with the sectarian policy of the communist parties in advanced 
capitalist nations and the commitment of the leaders of social democracy to the system led to 
the prevalence of the extreme right with devastating consequences. 
For a good part of heterodox literature these historical events have not served as an 
example. With the same ease that left theorists at the beginning of the century explained crisis 
from the disproportional growth of department I relative to department II they attempt to 
explain the present depression from the disproportional growth of the financial sector relative 
to the production sector. In other words financialization is understood independently from the 
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contradictions of profit motivated growth. This way a good part of heterodox literature 
concludes that proportionality can be restored through state regulation, which means in turn 
unimpeded growth under capitalism. Meantime neoclassical and neo-Keynesian economists 
are left unchallenged to discuss over the economic policy agenda while billions all-over the 
globe are facing the consequences.  
Marxist economics have made great progress in identifying and developing the 
argument in Marx, the work of Grossman in identifying Marx’s crisis theory , the presentation 
of the argument underlying Marx’s Capital by Rosdolsky and numerous contemporary 
analytical and empirical works, which cannot be presented in this context for spatial reasons, 
have appeared over the years. In this line of thought profit motivated growth and its inherent 
contradictions are central in the analysis. I have argued elsewhere (Stravelakis 2012) that 
financialization can be elaborated in the context of this argument. Viewed from this 
perspective the current crisis analytically classifies as a depression something which is 
confirmed from its duration and consequences. This understanding reveals also the nature of 
the policies implemented and can serve as starting point in promoting policy alternatives so 
desperately needed in our times.    
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